The rule, set forth in Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), that the new general standards for granting habeas corpus relief set out in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act do not apply to cases that were pending on the statute's effective date requires the filing of an actual application for relief before a case will be deemed "pending," a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court held March 25. The majority disapproved a contrary interpretation adopted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, under which a state prisoner's filings of a request for the appointment of counsel and a motion for a stay of execution rendered a case "pending." (Woodford v. Garceau, U.S., No. 01-1862, 3/25/03)

As amended by the AEDPA, Chapter 154 of Title 28 establishes standards for granting relief in certain capital cases whereas Chapter 153 sets out standards more generally applicable. In Lindh, the court reasoned that Chapter's 154 specification that its standards were applicable to cases pending on the act's effective date indicated that Chapter 153's standards were not intended to be applied to pending cases. The question for the court in the instant case was when a capital case not governed by Chapter 154 is "pending" for purposes of the Lindh rule. The position represented by the decision under review, 275 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2001), was contrary to the view taken by all the other federal courts of appeals that had considered the question.

Interpreting Lindh.

In an opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas, the majority said Lindh's rule should be interpreted in light of the AEDPA's goals of streamlining federal habeas review and promoting comity, finality, and federalism. Moreover, "[b]ecause of AEDPA's heavy emphasis on standards governing the review of the merits of a habeas application, we interpret the rule announced in Lindh in view of that emphasis …," the majority added. Requests for counsel and a stay are not proceedings seeking a review of the merits of a petitioner's claims, the majority stressed.

Turning to the language of the AEDPA, the majority noted that the provision of Chapter 153 that establishes a presumption of correctness for state court factual findings refers to "a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus." 28 USC 2254(e)(1). The majority said that if a habeas proceeding could be "instituted" by the filing of requests for counsel and a stay, the presumption would rarely apply. Congress could not have intended that result, it said. The majority also noted that Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 states that "[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint." "The logical conclusion," the majority said, "is that a habeas suit begins with the filing of an application for habeas corpus relief--the equivalent of a complaint in an ordinary civil case."

In support of the Ninth Circuit's rule, the habeas petitioner relied on McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849 (1994), and Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 63 CrL 351 (1998). In McFarland, the court held that a prisoner's request for the appointment of counsel to assist with a habeas corpus petition commences a "post-conviction proceeding" for purposes of 28 USC 848(q)(4)(B), which provides for the appointment of counsel for indigent capital prisoners. In Hohn, the court held that a court of appeals' denial of a certificate of appealability qualifies as a "case" in the court of appeals for purposes of a statute governing the court's jurisdiction, 28 USC 1254.

The majority said that the questions surrounding the court's interpretations of the statutes in McFarland and Hohn were specific and too dissimilar to the questions presented by the interpretation of Lindh to provide a basis for ruling in the petitioner's favor.

Merits Filing.

The petitioner also contended that his filing of a statement of nonfrivolous issues in connection with request for a stay, as well as his litigation of the state's contention that the statement was inadequate, amounted to a sufficient presentation of the merits of his claims to render his case pending for purposes of Lindh. Unpersuaded, the majority pointed out that the statement itself did not seek relief and referred only to claims that the petitioner might possibly present in a future application.

In a concurring opinion, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor agreed with the petitioner and the dissenters that the petitioner's filing of a statement of nonfrivolous issues presented the merits of the petitioner's claims. She agreed with the majority, however, that the Lindh rule should be interpreted as requiring the filing of an actual application for relief.

Dissenting, Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer, pointed out that the district court's ruling on the appropriateness of a stay necessarily considered the old standards governing the granting of habeas relief. He argued that a case should be considered pending for purposes of the Lindh rule if the habeas court has made a determination that took into consideration the standards for relief.

Janis S. McLean, of the California Attorney General's Office, argued for the state. State Public Defender Lynne S. Coffin, San Francisco, argued for the habeas petitioner.