The student loan debt of an unemployed single mother who lives with
her parents and suffers from a psychological condition is
dischargeable under Bankruptcy Code Section 523(a)(8), because
repayment of the loans would impose an undue hardship on her, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held Feb. 4, affirming the
bankruptcy and district courts (Educational Credit Management Corp.
v. Polleys,
10th Cir.,
No. 02-8059,
2/4/04).
Judge Paul J. Kelly Jr. joined the majority of the other circuits
that have adopted the test set forth in Brunner v. New York State
Higher Education Services Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987)
and found that the debtor met all three
requirements:
(1)
that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and expenses,
a "minimal" standard of living for herself and her
dependents if forced to repay the loans; (2) that additional
circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely to
persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the
student loans; and (3) that the debtor has made good faith efforts to
repay the loans.
Here, Kelly said the debtor could not do much more to lower her
current household living expenses, noting that she pays no rent or
utilities other than her telephone. He excused any failure on her part
to maximize her personal and professional resources, finding that her
mental health condition made this impossible.
Kelly said there is no indication that the debtor is trying to
abuse the system. To the contrary, he said she has tried
unsuccessfully to use her education to maximize her income, working at
accounting firms, to no avail. Circumstances beyond the debtor's
control have prevented her from reaching the goal of financial
independence, the judge concluded.
Kelly said the facts in the instant case indicate that the debtor
is seeking to discharge her student loan debt in good faith. Even
though the debtor has never made a payment on her student loans, the
judge said she has demonstrated her efforts to work with her student
loan lenders to negotiate repayment.
Psychological Condition.
The debtor, age 45, who has once been involuntarily committed and
has attempted suicide, takes antidepressants daily and has ongoing
expenses for medical and psychological care.
She has an accounting degree she paid for with student loans. She
has never repaid any of these loans, which now total approximately
$51,000. Repayment would require monthly payments of $420 over a
20-year period.
Educational Credit Management Corp. (ECMC), the holder of the
loans, objected to the debtor's discharge of the loans and appealed
the bankruptcy court and district court
orders.
Undefined Term.
Section 523(a)(8) states that an educational loan is not
dischargeable in bankruptcy unless "excepting such debt from
discharge … will impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the
debtor's dependents." The Code does not define the term
"undue hardship," nor has the Tenth Circuit specified a test
for determination of undue hardship. However, Kelly noted, in enacting
Section 523(a)(8), Congress was primarily concerned about abusive
student debtors and protecting the solvency of student loan programs
(citing In re Andresen, 232 B.R. 127, 137 (B.A.P. 8th Cir.
1999)(11 BBLR 320, 4/22/99). Kelly said Section 523(a)(8) was designed
to "remove the temptation of recent graduates to use the
bankruptcy system as a low-cost method of unencumbering future
earnings."
The various courts of appeals that have applied the undue hardship
provision of Section 523(a)(8) have adopted two tests, Kelly said,
noting that most circuits have adopted a version of the Second
Circuit's three factor test set forth in Brunner. Under the
Brunner analysis, if the court finds against the debtor on any
of the three factors, then the inquiry ends and the debtor's student
loans are not dischargeable.
In contrast, the Eighth Circuit in Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt.
Corp. (In re Long), 322 F.3d 549, 553 (2003), adopted a
"totality of the circumstances" test for analyzing undue
hardship. It provides that bankruptcy courts should consider:
• the
debtor's past, present, and reasonably reliable future financial
resources;
• a
calculation of the debtor's and her dependent's reasonable necessary
living expenses; and
• any
other relevant facts and circumstances surrounding each particular
bankruptcy case.
Hardship Analysis.
Applying the Brunnerfactors to the instant case, Kelly said
the first factor should serve as the starting point for the undue
hardship analysis because "information regarding a debtor's
current financial situation generally will be concrete and readily
obtainable."
Kelly said the second Brunnerfactor properly recognizes that
a student loan is "viewed as a mortgage on the debtor's future
(quoting Brunner). However, the judge continued, in applying
the second prong, courts need not demand a "certainty of
hopelessness."
Moreover, he stated, "courts should base their estimation of a
debtor's prospects on specific articulable facts, not unfounded
optimism"; and the examination into future circumstances should
not be extended beyond the foreseeable future.
Finally, Kelly said, an examination of the debtor's good faith
should focus on an analysis of the legitimacy of the basis for seeking
a discharge. However, he stressed, "good faith should not be used
as a means for courts to impose their own values on a debtor's life
choices."
Debilitating Emotional Problems.
The bankruptcy court made extensive findings that the debtor's
emotional health was fragile, noting that she "suffers from
debilitating emotional problems which, though counterproductive, are
obviously out of her control," Kelly said. He agreed with the
lower court's findings, and concluded that the debtor's mental health
problems are "at least as substantial and long lasting" as
the disability of the debtor in In re Pena, 155 F.3d 1108 (9th
Cir. 1998)(10 BBLR 989, 10/1/98). Pena held that the debtor's
depression "prevent[ed] long-term stability" and would
likely "continue to interfere with her ability to work," the
judge said. Contrary to ECMC's assertion, Kelly said the relevant case
law does not indicate that a permanent medical disability is any kind
of prerequisite to discharging a student loan debtor (citing In re
Cheesman, 25 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 1994)(6 BBLR 609, 6/16/94)).
Judges Carlos F. Lucero and Robert H. Henry joined the opinion.
Scott M. Browning and Craig R. Welling of Rothgerber, Johnson &
Lyons, Denver, appeared on brief for ECMC. Stephen R. Winship of
Winship & Winship, Casper, Wyo. appeared for the debtor.